Ambiguity in the sense of agency by Gallagher, Shaun
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - 
Papers Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities 
1-1-2013 
Ambiguity in the sense of agency 
Shaun Gallagher 
University of Memphis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers 
 Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gallagher, Shaun, "Ambiguity in the sense of agency" (2013). Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - 
Papers. 1359. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1359 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Ambiguity in the sense of agency 
Abstract 
In a variety of recent studies the concept of the sense of agency has been shown to be 
phenomenologically complex, involving different levels of experience, from the basic aspects of sensory-
motor processing (e.g., Farrer et al. 2003; Tsakiris and Haggard 2005; Tsakiris, Bosbach, and Gallagher 
2007) to the higher levels of intention formation and retrospective judgment (e.g., Pacherie 2006, 2007; 
Stephens and Graham 2000; Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen 2008; Gallagher 2007, 2010). After 
summarizing this complexity, I will argue, first, that the way that these various contributory elements 
manifest themselves in the actual phenomenology of agency remains ambiguous, and that this ambiguity 
is in fact part of the phenomenology. That is, although there surely is some degree of ambiguity in the 
analysis of this concept, perhaps because many of the theoretical and empirical studies cut across 
disciplinary lines, there is also a genuine ambiguity in the very experience of agency. Second, most 
studies of the sense of agency fail to take into consideration that it involves more than simply something 
that happens in the head (mind or brain), and specifically that it has a social dimension. 
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In a variety of recent studies the concept of the sense of agency has been shown to be 
phenomenologically complex, involving different levels of experience, from the basic 
aspects of sensory-motor processing (e.g., Farrer et al. 2003; Tsakiris and Haggard 2005; 
Tsakiris, Bosbach, and Gallagher 2007) to the higher levels of intention formation and 
retrospective judgment (e.g., Pacherie 2006; 2007; Stephens and Graham 2000; Synofzik, 
Vosgerau and Newen 2008; Gallagher 2010).  After summarizing this complexity, I will 
argue, first, that the way that these various contributory elements manifest themselves in 
the actual phenomenology of agency remains ambiguous, and that this ambiguity is in 
fact part of the phenomenology.  That is, although there surely is some degree of 
ambiguity in the analysis of this concept, perhaps because many of the theoretical and 
empirical studies cut across disciplinary lines, there is also a genuine ambiguity in the 
very experience of agency.   Second, most studies of the sense of agency fail to take into 
consideration that it involves more than simply something that happens in the head (mind 
or brain), and specifically that it has a social dimension. 
 
 
Complexities1 
 
Normally when I engage in action I have a sense of agency for that action.  How is that 
sense or experience of agency generated?  I turns out that there are a number of things 
that can contribute to this experience.  Some, but not all of these things do contribute to 
the experience of agency in all cases.  I’ll start with the most basic – those aspects that 
seem to be always involved – and then move those that are only sometimes involved. 
 
Motor control processes 
If we think of the sense of self-agency (SA) as the experience that I am the one who is 
causing or generating the movement, then we can distinguish SA from the sense of 
ownership (SO) for movement, which is the sense that I am the one who is undergoing 
the movement – that it is my body moving, whether the movement is voluntary or 
involuntary (Gallagher 2000a&b).  In the case of involuntary movement, SA is missing, 
but I still have SO.  If I’m pushed, I still have the sense that I am the one moving, even if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This and the following section summarizes some of the material discussed in Gallagher (2010). 
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I did not cause the movement. These experiences are pre-reflective, which means that 
they neither are equivalent to nor depend on the subject taking an introspective reflective 
attitude.  Nor do they require that the subject engages in an explicit perceptual monitoring 
of bodily movements. Just as I do not attend to the details of my own bodily movements 
as I am engaged in action, my sense of agency is not normally something that I attend to 
or something of which I am explicitly aware.  As such, SA is phenomenologically 
recessive.  
If we are thinking of action as physical, embodied action that involves self-
generated movement, then motor control processes are necessarily involved.  The most 
basic of these are efferent brain processes that are involved in issuing a motor command.  
Let’s think again about involuntary movement.  In the case of involuntary movement 
there is a sense of ownership (SO) for the movement but no sense of self-agency.  
Awareness of my involuntary movement comes from reafferent sensory-feedback (visual 
and proprioceptive/kinaesthetic information that tells me that I’m moving).  There are no 
initial motor commands (no efferent signals) that I issue to generate the movement.  It 
seems possible that in both involuntary and voluntary movement SO is generated by 
sensory feedback, and that in the case of voluntary movement a basic, pre-reflective SA 
is generated by efferent signals. Tsakiris and Haggard (2005; also see Tsakiris 2005) 
review empirical evidence to support this division of labor.  They suggest that efferent 
processes underlying SA modulate sensory feedback resulting from movement.  Sensory 
suppression experiments (Tsakiris and Haggard 2003) suggest that SA arises at an early 
efferent stage in the initiation of action and that awareness of the initiation of my own 
action depends on central signals, which precede actual bodily movement.  Experiments 
with subjects who lack proprioception but still experience a sense of effort reinforce this 
conclusion (Lafargue, Paillard, Lamarre, & Sirigu 2003; see Marcel 2003).  As Tsakiris 
and Haggard put it,  
 
the sense of agency involves a strong efferent component, because actions 
are centrally generated. The sense of ownership involves a strong afferent 
component, because the content of body awareness originates mostly by the 
plurality of multisensory peripheral signals. We do not normally experience 
the efferent and afferent components separately. Instead, we have a general 
awareness of our body that involves both components. (Tsakiris and 
Haggard 2005, 387). 
 
This pre-reflective SA does not arise simply when I initiate an action; as I continue 
to control my action, continuing efferent signals, and the kind of afferent feedback that I 
get from my movement, contribute to an ongoing SA.2  To the extent that I am aware of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 It is important to distinguish SA, as related to motor control processes, from what Fabio Paglieri (this 
volume) calls the experience of freedom, which, he argues, has no positive pre-reflective phenomenology. 
Paglieri distinguishes the question of an experience of freedom from other aspects that may be involved in 
SA, e.g., the experience of action control, and leaves the phenomenological status of such aspects an open 
question.  This is consistent with my own view about the distinction between issues pertaining to motor 
control (as in the Libet experiments) and anything like an experience of freedom, which I understand not 
to be reducible to motor control (Gallagher 2006).  Paglieri nonetheless expresses a skepticism about the 
sense of agency and suggests that “it rests on an invalid inference from sub-personal hypotheses to 
phenomenological conclusions” (p. ?).  In fact, however, the inference validly goes in the other direction.  
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my action, however, I tend to be aware of what I am doing rather than the details of how I 
am doing it, e.g., what muscles I am using.  Even my recessive awareness of my action is 
struck at the most pragmatic level of description (“I’m getting a drink”) rather than at a 
level of motor control mechanisms.  That is, the phenomenal experience of my action 
already involves an intentional aspect.  What I am trying to accomplish in the way of 
basic movements (e.g., moving out of the way, walking to open the door, reaching for a 
drink) informs my body-schematic processes, which are intentional (and reflect what 
Merleau-Ponty calls a motor intentionality) just because they are constrained by what I 
am trying to do. 
 
Intentional aspects in SA 
Several brain imaging experiments have shown that the intentional aspects of what I am 
trying to do and what actually I accomplish in the world enter into our sense of agency.  
These experiments help us to distinguish between the purely motor control contributories 
(the sense that I am moving my body) and the most immediate and perceptually-based 
intentional aspects (the sense that I am having an effect on my immediate environment) 
of action (Chaminade and Decety 2002; Farrer and Frith 2002).  These experiments, 
however, already introduce a certain theoretical ambiguity into the study of SA, since 
they fail to clearly distinguish between motor control aspects and intentional aspects.   
For example, in their fMRI experiment, Farrer and Frith (2002), designed to find 
the neural correlates of SA, subjects are asked to manipulate a joystick to drive a colored 
circle moving on a screen to specific locations on the screen. In some instances the 
subject causes this movement and in others the experimenter or computer does.  The 
subject has to discriminate self-agency and other-agency. Farrer and Frith cite the 
distinction between SA and SO (from Gallagher 2000a), but associate SA with the 
intentional aspect of action, i.e., whether I am having some kind of effect with respect to 
the goal or intentional task (or what happens on the computer screen).  Accordingly, their 
claim is that SO (“my hand is moving the joystick”) remains constant while SA (“I’m 
manipulating the circle”) changes.  When subjects feel that they are not controlling the 
events on the screen, there is activation in the right inferior parietal cortex and 
supposedly no SA for the intentional aspect of the action.  When the subject does have 
SA for what happens on the screen, the anterior insula is activated bilaterally.  
Although Farrer and Frith clearly think of SA as something tied to the intentional 
aspect of action and not to mere bodily movement or motor control, when it comes to 
explaining why the anterior insula should be involved in generating SA, they frame the 
explanation in terms of motor control and bodily movment. 
 
Why should the parietal lobe have a special role in attributing actions to 
others while the anterior insula is concerned with attributing actions to the 
self? The sense of agency (i.e., being aware of causing an action) occurs in 
the context of a body moving in time and space … [and] critically depends 
upon the experience of such a body. There is evidence that …. the anterior 
insula, in interaction with limbic structures, is also involved in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
It starts from the phenomenological distinction between SA and SO, originally worked out in the context 
of the schizophrenic delusions of control, and then asks what the neurological underpinnings of SA might 
be (see, e.g., Farrer and Frith 2002; Tsakiris and Haggard 2005). 
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representation of body schema …. One aspect of the experience of agency 
that we feel when we move our bodies through space is the close 
correspondence between many different sensory signals. In particular there 
will be a correspondence between three kinds of signal: somatosensory 
signals directly consequent upon our movements, visual and auditory signals 
that may result indirectly from our movements, and last, the corollary 
discharge [efferent signal] associated with motor commands that generated 
the movements. A close correspondence between all these signals helps to 
give us a sense of agency. (Farrer and Frith 2002, 601-02). 
 
In a separate study Farrer et al. (2003) have the same goal of discovering the neural 
correlates of SA.  In this experiment subjects provide a report on their experience; 
however, all questions about agency were focused on bodily movement rather than 
intentional aspect.  In fact, subjects were not given an intentional task to carry out other 
than making random movements using a joystick, and the focus of their attention was 
directed towards a virtual (computer image) hand that either did or did not represent their 
own hand movements, although at varying degrees of rotation relative to true position of 
the subject’s hand. That is, they moved their own hand, but saw a virtual hand projected 
on screen at veridical or non-veridical angles to their own hand; the virtual hand was 
either under their control, or not.  Subjects were asked about their experience of agency 
for control of the virtual hand movements.  The less the subject felt in control, the higher 
the level of activation in the right inferior parietal cortex, consistent with Farrer and Frith 
(2002). The more the subject felt in control, the higher the level of activation in the right 
posterior insula. This result is in contrast with the previous study where SA was 
associated with activation of the right anterior insula.  Referencing this difference, Farrer 
et al. state: “We have no explanation as to why the localization of the activated areas 
differ in these studies, except that we know that these two regions are densely and 
reciprocally connected” (2003, p. 331).  One clear explanation, however, is that the shift 
of focus from the intentional aspect (accomplishing a computer screen task in Farrer and 
Frith) to simple control of bodily movement (in Farrer et al.) changes the aspect of SA 
that is being studied.  It would be helpful in these experiments to clearly distinguish 
between the intentional aspect and the motor (efferent) aspect of agency, and to say that 
there are at least these two contributories to SA.  
 
Intention formation 
Over and above the sensory-motor processes that involve motor control and the 
perceptual processes that allow us to monitor the intentional aspects of our actions, there 
are higher-order cognitive components involving intention formation that contribute to 
SA.  Pacherie (2007; and others like Bratman 1987 and Searle 1983) distinguish between 
future or distal intentions and present intentions.  Future or “F”-intentions relate to prior 
deliberation processes that allow us to formulate our relatively long-term goals.  For 
example, I may decide to purchase a car tomorrow (or next week, or next month, or at 
some undetermined time when there is a good rebate available), and then at the 
appropriate time go out and engage in that action.  Not all actions involve prior intention 
formation.  For example, I may decide right now to get a drink from the kitchen and find 
myself already moving in that direction.  In that case I have not formed an F-intention, 
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although my action is certainly intentional.  In that case, I may have a present or P-
intention (or what Searle calls and ‘intention-in-action’).  My intention to get a drink 
from the kitchen may involve an actual decision to get up and to move in the direction of 
the kitchen – and in doing so I may be monitoring what I am doing in an explicitly 
conscious way.  It may be a rather complex action.  At my university office the kitchen is 
located down the hall and it is locked in the evening.  If I want to get a drink I have to 
walk up the hall, retrieve the key for the kitchen from a common room, and then proceed 
back down to the kitchen, unlock the door, retrieve the drink, relock the door, return the 
key and return to my office.  Although I may be thinking of other things as I do this, I am 
also monitoring a set of steps that are not automatic. 
In other cases I may be so immersed in my work that I don’t even notice that I’m 
reaching for the glass of water on the table next to me.  Here my intentional action may 
be closer to habitual and there is no P- or F-intention involved.  In such cases, I would 
still have a minimal SA, connected with what Pacherie (2007) calls a motor or M-
intention, and consisting of the pre-reflective sense generated in motor control processes 
and a rather recessive intentional aspect (which I may only notice if I knock over the 
glass or spill the drink).    
It is likely that when there is an F- and/or P-intention involved, such intentions 
generate a stronger SA.  Certainly, if I form an F-intention to buy a new car tomorrow, 
and tomorrow I go to the car dealership and purchase a car, I will feel more in charge of 
my life than if, without prior intention I simply find myself lured into a car dealership, 
purchasing a car without prior planning.  In the latter case, even if I do not deny that I am 
the agent of my action, I might feel a bit out of control.  So it seems clear that part of the 
phenomenology of agency may be tied, in some cases, to the formation of a prior 
intention.  It’s important here to distinguish between the cognitive level of intention 
formation – which may involve making judgments and decisions based on beliefs, 
desires, or evaluations – and a first-order level of experience where we find SA.  SA is 
not itself a judgment, although I may judge that I am the agent of a certain action based 
on my sense of agency for it.  But what is clear is that intention formation may generate a 
stronger SA than would exist without the formation of F- or P-intentions. 
 
Retrospective attribution 
The effect of the formation of a prior intention is clearly prospective.  But there are post-
action processes that can have a retrospective effect on the sense of agency. Graham and 
Stephens (1994; Stephens and Graham 2000) provide an account of introspective 
alienation in schizophrenic symptoms of delusions of control and thought insertion in 
terms of two kinds of self-attribution. 
 
– Attributions of subjectivity: the subject reflectively realizes and is able to 
report that he is moving.  For example, he can say, "This is my body that is 
moving."  
– Attributions of agency: the subject reflectively realizes and is able to report 
that he is the cause or author of his movement.  For example, he can say "I 
am causing this action." 
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 According to Graham and Stephens the sense of agency originates at this higher-
order level of attribution. They propose an explanation of SA in terms of  “our proclivity 
for constructing self-referential narratives” which allow us to explain our behavior 
retrospectively: “such explanations amount to a sort of theory of the person’s agency or 
intentional psychology” (1994, 101; Stephens and Graham, 2000, 161). If we take 
thinking itself to be a kind of action on our part, then our sense of agency for that 
thinking action derives from a reflective attitude toward it. 
 
[W]hether I take myself to be the agent of a mental episode depends upon whether 
I take the occurrence of this episode to be explicable in terms of my underlying 
intentional states (1994, 93). 
On this view our sense of agency for a particular action depends on whether we can 
reflectively explain our action in terms of our beliefs, desires, and intentions.  
Accordingly, if a subject does or thinks something for which she has no intentions, and 
her action fails to accord with her beliefs and desires – mental states that would normally 
explain or rationalize the action – then the action or thought would not appear as 
something she intentionally does or thinks.  Whether I count something as my action thus 
depends upon whether I take myself to have beliefs and desires of the sort 
that would rationalize its occurrence in me.  If my theory of myself ascribes 
to me the relevant intentional states, I unproblematically regard this 
episode as my action.  If not, then I must either revise my picture of my 
intentional states or refuse to acknowledge the episode as my doing. (1994, 
102).   
On this approach, I have a sense of agency, and specifically for my actions because I 
have a properly ordered set of second-order retrospective interpretations (see Graham and 
Stephens 1994, 102; Stephens and Graham 2000, 162ff). 
Pacherie indicates that F-intentions are subject to normative pressures for 
consistency and coherence relative to the agent's beliefs and other intentions.  This would 
also seem to be the case with Graham and Stephens retrospective attributions.  But in 
either case, the fact that I may fail to justify my actions or think that my actions fail to fit 
with my theory or narrative about myself retrospectively, does not necessarily remove my 
sense of agency for the action, although it may diminish it.  That is, it seems wrong to 
think, as Graham and Stephens suggest, that retrospective attribution actually constitutes 
my sense of agency; but one should acknowledge that it can have an effect on SA, either 
strengthening it or weakening it.   
Within the realm of the normal, we can have two extremes.  In one case I may 
generally feel that I am in control of my life because I usually follow through and act on 
my intentions.  I think and deliberate about an action, and form an F-intention to do it.  
When the time comes I remember my F-intention and I see that it is the appropriate time 
and situation to begin acting to fulfill that intention.  My P-intentions coincide with the 
successful guidance of the action; my motor control is good and all of the intentional 
factors line up.  Subsequently, as I reflect on my action, it seems to me to be a good fit 
with how I think of myself and I can fully attribute responsibility for that action to 
myself.  It seems that in this case I would feel a very strong sense of agency for the 
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action, all contributing aspects – prospective intention formation, contemporary control 
factors, and retrospective attribution – giving me a coherent experience of that action.  In 
another case, however, I may have a minimal SA – no F- or P-intention and no 
retrospective attribution or evaluation.  My SA for the action may just be my thin 
experience of having motor control over something that I just did. (See Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Complexities in SA 
 
 
Ambiguities  
  
Pacherie suggests that mechanisms analogous to motor control mechanisms can explain 
the formation of F- and P-intentions.  
 
The contents represented at the level of F-intentions as well as the format in 
which these contents are represented and the computational processes that 
operate on them are obviously rather different from the contents, 
representational formats and computational processes operating at the level 
of M-intentions. Yet, the general idea that internal models divide into inverse 
models which compute the means towards a given goal and forward models 
which compute the consequences of implementing these means retains its 
validity at the level of F-intentions. …  Similarly, it is highly plausible that 
action-specification at the level of P-intentions makes use of internal models 
.... (2007, 4). 
 
That our deliberation about future actions involves thinking about the means and ends of 
our actions seems uncontroversial. Pacherie’s proposal does raise one question, however.  
If we regard thinking, such as the deliberative process that may be involved in intention 
formation, itself as a kind of action, then do we also have a sense of agency for the 
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thinking or deliberation involved in the formation of F-intentions?  It seems right to 
suggest that if I engage in a reflectively conscious process of deliberating about my 
future actions and make some decisions on this basis, I would have a sense of agency for 
(or from) this deliberation.3  You could interrupt me during this process and ask what I 
am doing, and I could say: “I’m sitting here deliberating about buying a car.”  The sense 
of agency that I feel for my ongoing deliberation process may be based on my sense of 
control over it; my response to your question is a retrospective attribution that may 
confirm this sense of agency.  It’s also possible that my SA for my deliberation derives in 
part from a previous deliberation process (I may have formed the F-intention yesterday to 
do my deliberations (i.e., to form my F-intentions) about car buying today).  It is clearly 
the case, however, that not all forming of F-intentions require a prior intention to do so, 
otherwise we would have an infinite regress.  We would have to deliberate about 
deliberating about deliberating, etc.  Furthermore, it is possible to have P-intentions for 
the action of forming F-intentions, where P-intentions in this case may be a form of 
metacognition where we are conscious of our cognitive strategies as we form our F-
intentions.  Certainly, however, it is not always the case that we engage in this kind of 
metacognition as we formulate our F-intentions.   It seems, then, that we can have a 
minimal first-order sense of agency for our deliberations without prior deliberation or 
occurent metacognitive monitoring. 
 On the one hand, the sense of agency for a particular action (X) is different from 
the sense of agency for the intention formation to do X.  They are obviously not 
equivalent since there are two different actions involved, X, and the act of deliberation 
about X.  On the other hand, it seems likely that SA for my deliberation may contribute to 
my reflective sense (and my retrospective attribution) that I am the agent of my own 
actions.  Pacherie refers to this as the long-term sense of agency: 
 
a sense of oneself as an agent apart from any particular action, i.e. a sense of 
one's capacity for action over time, and a form of self-narrative where one's 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This may be part of “what it’s like” or the phenomenal feel of such cognitive processes.  Of course there 
is an ongoing debate about whether higher-order cognitive activities such as evaluating or judging come 
with a phenomenal or qualitative feel to them.  There are three possibilities here.  (1) Cognitive states 
simply have no phenomenal feel to them. But if such states have no qualitative feel to them, it shouldn’t 
feel like anything to make a judgment or solve a math problem, and we would have to say that we do not 
experience such things, since on standard definitions phenomenal consciousness is experiential (e.g., Block 
1995, 230). If you do the phenomenology when you do the math, this doesn’t seem correct; but let’s allow 
it as a possibility.  (2) Cognitive states do have a phenomenal feel to them, but different cognitive states 
have no distinguishable phenomenal feels to them so that deciding to propose marriage and solving a math 
problem feel the same.  Perhaps they do for some people.  (3) Different cognitive states do have 
distinguishable phenomenal feels to them – deciding to propose marriage does feel different from solving a 
math problem. On this view, which is the one I would defend (see Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, 49ff.), in 
forming our intentions we sometimes find it easy and sometimes difficult, sometimes with much 
uncertainty or much effort, and accordingly one process of intention formation might feel different from the 
other. In either case (2) or (3) there would be room for SA as an experiential component. E.g., part of what 
it feels like for me to solve a math problem is that I am the one going through he steps; I am the one finding 
it difficult or easy, as I solve the problem.  But even if there were no phenomenal feel to such cognitive 
processes, it may still be the case that having gone through the process, the result itself, e.g., that I have a 
plan, or that my mind is made up, may have a certain feel that contributes to a stronger experience of 
agency for the action in question.  Acting on a prior plan, for example, feels differently from acting 
spontaneously.  
	   Page	  9	  
past actions and projected future actions are given a general coherence and 
unified through a set of overarching goals, motivations, projects and general 
lines of conduct. (2007, 6) 
 
As such it may enter into the occurent sense of agency for any particular action.  
Furthermore, if I lacked SA for my deliberation process, it might feel more like an 
intuition or unbidden thought, or indeed, if I were schizophrenic, it might feel like an 
inserted thought.  In any case, it might feel less than integrated with what Graham and 
Stephens call the  “theory or story of [the subject’s] own underlying intentional states,” 
something that itself contributes to SA for the action.  So it seems that SA for the 
deliberation process itself may contribute to SA for the action X in two indirect ways. 
First, by contributing to my long-term sense of agency, and second, by contributing to the 
effect of any retrospective attribution I may engage in.  Still, as I indicated, there need not 
be (and, under threat of infinite regress, there can not be) a deliberation process for every 
action that I engage in.   
 Similarly for P-intentions.  If action monitoring, at the level of P-intentions, is 
itself a kind of action (if, for example, it involves making judgments about certain 
environmental factors), there may be a sense of agency for that action monitoring?  The 
processes that make up a P-intention are much closer to the intended action itself and 
may not feel like an additional or separate action. I can imagine a very explicit kind of P-
intention in the form of a conscious monitoring of what I am doing.  For example, I may 
be putting together a piece of furniture by following a set of instructions. In that case I 
could have a sense of agency for following the instructions and closely monitoring my 
actions in terms of means-ends.  Certainly doing it that way would feel very different 
from doing it without following the set of instructions.  But the SA for following the 
instructions would really go hand in glove with SA for the action of assembling the 
furniture. How we distinguish such things would really depend on how we define the 
action.   
In the process of assembling the furniture, I may start by reading instruction #1; I 
then turn to the pieces of wood in front of me and join two of them together.  I can 
distinguish the act of reading from the act of joining and define SA for each of them. In 
that case, however, one can ask whether SA for the act of reading doesn’t contribute to 
SA for the act of joining.  I might, however, think of the reading and the joining as one 
larger action of assembling the furniture, and SA might be defined broadly to incorporate 
all aspects of that assembling.  It might also be the case that when I put together a second 
piece of furniture, I don’t consult the instructions at all, in which case SA is more 
concentrated in the joining.  In most practiced actions a P-intention is really unnecessary 
because motor control processes and perceptual monitoring of the intentional aspect can 
do the job, i.e., can keep my action on track.  I might simply make up my mind (an F-
intention) to do this task, and I go and immediately start to do the task without further 
monitoring in terms of means-ends.  All of this suggests that how we experience agency 
is relative to the way we define specific actions, and how practiced those actions are. 
This means that there is some serious ambiguity, not simply in the way we define 
the sense of agency, but in the sense – the experience – of agency itself.  This 
phenomenological ambiguity – the very ambiguity of our experience of agency – should 
be included in our considerations about the sense of agency.  Clear-cut and unambiguous 
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definitions may create a neat conceptual map; but the landscape itself may not be so neat.  
It is not always the case, as Pacherie sometimes suggests, that P-intentions serve to 
implement action plans inherited from F-intentions, since there are not always F-
intentions.  It is not always the case that “the final stage in action specification involves 
the transformation of the perceptual-actional contents of P-intentions into sensorimotor 
representations (M-intentions) through a precise specification of the spatial and temporal 
characteristics of the constituent elements of the selected motor program” (Pacherie 
2007, 3), since there are not always P-intentions.  Pacherie also suggests that a sense of 
action initiation and a sense of control are “crucial” components in the sense of agency 
(2007, 17-18) and that in both components the P-intention plays a large role.  But the fact 
that some actions for which we have SA take place without P-intentions puts this idea in 
question.  
The sense of action initiation, Pacherie suggests, is based on the binding of P-
intention and awareness of movement onset in the very small timeframe of 80-200 ms 
prior to actual movement onset corresponding to the time of the lateralized readiness 
potential, a signal that corresponds to selection of a specific motor program (Libet 1985; 
Haggard 2003).  She associates the P-intention with what Haggard distinguishes as urge 
to move and reference forward to the goal of the action.  But these aspects of action 
experience can be purely pre-reflective, generated by motor-control processes, and form 
part of the M-intention (see Desmurget et al. 2009 for relevant data).  In this regard it is 
important to distinguish P-intention from the pre-reflective perceptual monitoring of the 
intentional aspects of the action that can occur without a formed P-intention, as in 
practiced action.  Whereas monitoring of the intentional aspects can contribute to SA 
whether we have a conscious intention in terms of specific goals or not (Aartsa, Custersa, 
and Wegner 2005), the P-intention does not seem crucial for SA. 
Pacherie further suggests that the sense of control has three dimensions 
corresponding to F-intentions, P-intentions, and M-intentions.  Again, however, the sense 
of control may be reflectively conscious for F- and P-intentions, but, as generated in 
motor-control mechanisms it may remain pre-reflectively conscious as long as the action 
is going well, e.g., as long as I don’t stumble over or knock into something.  A conscious 
judgment or conscious sense of control associated with the P-intention may in fact be 
absent until that point when something starts to go wrong at the motor-control level, and 
it may be motivated by what I experience in the pre-reflective monitoring of the 
intentional aspect of action.   
What seem legitimate conceptual distinctions on the theoretical level – 
“awareness of a goal, awareness of an intention to act, awareness of initiation of action, 
awareness of movements, sense of activity, sense of mental effort, sense of physical 
effort, sense of control, experience of authorship, experience of intentionality, experience 
of purposiveness, experience of freedom, and experience of mental causation” (Pacherie 
2007, 6) – may not show up as such in the actual first-order phenomenology.   They may 
be the product of theoretical reflection on the first-order phenomenology.  As I engage in 
action, for example, I may not experience a difference between my sense of effort and my 
sense of control, although I can certainly make that distinction in my reflective 
(prospective or retrospective) consideration of my action.  That distinction may show up 
clearly at the level of my retrospective attribution, but may be entirely lost in my 
immersed SA.  My awareness of what I am doing and that I am doing it is usually struck 
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at the most pragmatic level of description (“I’m getting a drink”) rather than at a level 
that distinguishes between the action and my agency, or within the action between the 
goal and the means, or within agency between intentional causation, initiation, and 
control – distinctions that Pacherie suggests can be found in the phenomenology.   
Phenomenologically, however, there is no such thing as a “naked intention” – the 
awareness of an action without an awareness of who the agent is (Jeannerod and Pacherie 
2004) – or “agent-neutral” action experience (Pacherie 2007, 16).  The awareness that I 
am the agent of an action is implicit in the pre-reflective awareness of acting, which does 
not contain an awareness of causation separate from awareness of control.  Pacherie is 
thus absolutely right to note that a conceptual analysis cannot “preempt the question 
whether these various aspects are dissociable or not, for instance whether we can be 
aware of what we are doing independently of an awareness of how we're doing it or 
whether we can be aware of what we are doing without at the same time experiencing 
this action as ours” (2007, 7).  What can decide the issue, however, is agreement on 
where to draw the lines between phenomenological analysis (i.e., of what we actually 
experience), neuroscientific analysis (which may find a much finer grain of articulations 
at the neuronal level than show up in phenomenology), and conceptual analysis (which 
may introduce distinctions that are in neither the phenomenology nor the neurology, but 
may have a productive role to play in constructing cognitive models or, in regard to the 
individual, explaining psychological motivations, etc.). 
 
 
Pushing this analysis into the world 
 
The sense of agency is both complex and ambiguous. It has multiple contributories, 
some of which are reflectively conscious, some of which are pre-reflectively conscious, 
and some of which are non-conscious. Consistent with phenomenological theories of 
embodiment, in everyday engaged action reafferent or sensory-feedback signals are 
attenuated, implying a recessive consciousness of the body in action (see e.g., Gallagher 
2005; Tsakiris and Haggard 2005).  We do not attend to the details of our bodily 
movements in most actions.  We do not stare at our own hands as we decide to use them; 
we do not look at our feet as we walk, we do not attend to our arm movements as we 
engage the joystick.  Most efferent, motor-control and body-schematic processes are non-
conscious and automatic.  Just such processes nonetheless contribute to a conscious sense 
of agency by generating a pre-reflective awareness of our actions. In most normal actions 
the sense of agency runs along with and is experientially indistinguishable from a basic 
sense of ownership; likely efferent and reafferent signals are integrated in the insula.  SA 
is part of our basic feeling of embodiment without which our actions would feel very 
different.  In addition, we also experience, pre-reflectively, a form of intentional 
feedback, which is not afferent feedback about our bodily movements, but a perceptual 
sense that my action is having an effect in the world.  This effect is not something that we 
reflectively dwell on, or even retain in memory.  A good example of this is our usual 
perceptual awareness while driving a car.   
The sense of agency for some actions may amount to nothing more than this.  For 
other actions, however, the sense of agency is not reducible to just these embodied and 
pre-reflective processes. In addition, in many cases we may be reflectively conscious of 
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and concerned about what we are doing.  For such actions the sense of agency will be 
tied to a more reflective sense of intention, involving attention directed toward the project 
or task that we are engaged in, or toward the means and/or end that we aim for. 
Conceptually we can identify at least five different contributories to the sense of 
agency that may be connected with a particular action.    
 
• Formation of F-intentions, often involving the prospective reflective deliberation 
or planning that precedes action  
• Formation of P-intentions, that is, the conscious monitoring of action in terms of 
specific means-ends relations 
• Basic efferent motor-control processes generate a first-order experience linked to 
bodily movement in and towards an environment 
• Pre-reflective perceptual monitoring of the effect of my action in the world 
• The retrospective attribution of agency that follows action  
 
We could add to this the long-term sense of one's capacity for action over time, which 
Pacherie identifies as related to self-narrative “where one's past actions and projected 
future actions are given a general coherence and unified through a set of overarching 
goals, motivations, projects and general lines of conduct” (2007, 6). 
Although conceptually we may distinguish between different levels (first-order, 
higher-order), and aspects, and neuroscientifically we may be able to identify different 
brain processes responsible for these different contributories, in action, and in our 
everyday phenomenology we tend to experience agency in a more holistic, qualitative, 
and ambiguous way which may be open to a description in terms of degree. 
The conceptual articulation of the different aspects of the sense of agency suggests 
that the loss or disruption of SA in different pathologies may be varied.  In schizophrenic 
delusions of control the motor-control aspects may be disrupted. In other cases the 
attribution of self-agency may be disrupted by problems with retrospective higher-order 
cognition or the prospective formation of F-intentions.  A good example of this is the 
case of narcotic addition, as discussed by Frankfurt (1988).  If a drug addict invests 
himself in resisting drugs he may feel that something other than himself is compelling 
him to drug use.  If he withdraws from taking the drug, when he starts using again he 
may not conceive of himself as the agent. 
 
It is in virtue of this identification and withdrawal, accomplished through the 
formation of second-order volition, that the unwilling addict may 
meaningfully make the analytically puzzling statements that the force 
moving him to take the drug is a force other than his own, and that it is not of 
his own free will but rather against his will that this force moves him to take 
it (Frankfurt 1988, 18; see Grünbaum 2009, for discussion). 
 
The sense of agency may be present or absent, diminished or increased depending on 
processes or disruptions of processes at different levels. Thus, the loss of the sense of 
agency in various pathologies – including schizophrenia, anarchic hand syndrome, 
obsessive-compulsive behavior, narcotic addiction, etc. – may in fact involve different 
sorts of loss and very different experiences.  
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Everything that we have said so far, however, if rich in details, is still narrow in 
the scope of what should be included in such an analysis.  Although what we have said so 
far acknowledges a role for the body and the environment in action – many of the pre-
reflective aspects being generated in motor control and the intentional aspect of what we 
are doing – almost all of the processes described remain “in the head,” insofar as they are 
either mental processes – deliberation, intention formation, judgment, evaluation, 
perceptual monitoring – or brain processes – efferent commands, integration of afferent 
signals, premotor processes and motor control.   It almost seems as if all of the action, all 
of the important processes concerning intention and action, take place in the narrow 
confines of the mind-brain, even though we know that action takes place in the world, 
and most often in social interactions.   
One simple way to ask the question is: How do other people and social forces 
affect the sense of agency?  On the very basic pre-reflective level, the presence of others 
has an effect on what my possibilities for action are, and the way that I perceive the 
world in action contexts. 
Jean-Paul Sartre points in this direction, in a very dramatic way.  In his example 
he is sitting alone in a park.  Suddenly, someone else enters the park. 
 
Suddenly an object has appeared which has stolen the world from me. 
Everything [remains] in place; everything still exists for me; but 
everything is traversed by an invisible flight and fixed in the direction of a 
new object. The appearance of the Other in the world corresponds 
therefore to a fixed sliding of the whole universe, to a decentralization of 
the world which undermines the centralization which I am simultaneously 
effecting. (1969, p. 255) 
 
This overly dramatic philosophical description, however, is supported by some 
interesting science.  Consider what we might term the Social Simon Effect.  The Simon 
Effect is found in a traditional stimulus-response task. Participants respond to different 
colors, pressing a button to their left with their left hand for blue and a button to their 
right with their right hand for red.  They are asked to ignore the location of the color 
(which may be displayed either in their right or left visual field). An incongruence 
(mismatch) of right vs left between the color location and hand used to respond results in 
increased reaction times (Simon, 1969).  When a subject is asked to respond to just one 
color with one hand, as you might expect, there is no conflict and no effect on reaction 
time.  The surprising thing is that when the subject has exactly the same task (pushing 
one button for one color) but is seated next to another person who is responding to a 
different color -- each person responding to one color – each acting as if one of the 
fingers in the original experiment – reaction times increased for the incongruent trials. 
(Takahama 2005).  Similar results are found in trials using a go-nogo task where reaction 
times slowed when another person sitting next to the subject also engaged in the task, but 
not when that person was simply present and not engaged.  Thus, “the same go-nogo task 
is performed differently depending on whether one acts alone or alongside another agent 
performing a complementary action” (Sebanz et al. 2003; see Sebanz et al. 2006).	  
These kinds of things happen on the non-conscious level and likely have an effect 
on one’s pre-reflective sense of agency.  But they may become much more explicitly self-
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conscious.  Consider instances where you are quite capable of and perhaps even 
proficient at doing action A, e.g., successfully throwing a basketball through the hoop.  
Your performance may be affected simply by the fact of having an audience of very tall 
basketball superstars.  You might in fact feel a degree of inadequacy in such a 
circumstance, simply because certain people are present.   
More generally, the prospective and retrospective dimensions of intention 
formation and action interpretation, which affect SA, are often shaped by others, and by 
the situations in which we encounter others.  Deciding to buy a certain kind of car (or any 
other commodity) may be influenced by what your friends consider to be an appropriate 
choice.  In contrast to internalist views – e.g., where simply having a belief about A 
encompasses the motivation to A (e.g., Nagel 1970) – and in contrast to many analyses of 
agency in philosophy of mind and action theory, deliberations, intentions and motivations 
to act are not simply mental states (propositional attitudes), or causal brain states – they 
are often co-constituted with others.  Phenomena such as peer pressure, social 
referencing, which may be implicit or explicit, or our habitual behavior when in the 
presence of others – these phenomena may detract from or increase one’s feeling of 
agency. 
In this regard, there are extreme cases, like compulsive or addictive situations, 
Hysteria or Conversion Disorder.  In addictive behavior, for example, there is a loss of 
the sense of agency for one’s actions – but this is not just the result of chemically induced 
dependency.  Compulsive drug-related behaviors correlate neither with the degree of 
pleasure reported by users nor with reductions in withdrawal symptoms as measured in 
placebo studies and the subjective reports of users. Robinson and Berridge (1993; 2000) 
propose a “incentive-sensitization” model: pathological addiction correlates highly with 
the salience of socially situated drug related behaviors and stimuli.  For example, specific 
situations (including the agent’s perception of his social world) are altered, and become 
increasingly hedonically significant to the agent.  Brain regions mediating incentive-
sensitization are inscribed within the same areas that process action specification, motor 
control, and social cognition -- regions of the brain thought to code for intentional 
deliberation, social navigation, and action (Allen 2009). This reinforces the idea that 
situational salience – including perceptual salience of the social situation – contributes to 
intention formation and the sense of agency – sometimes enhancing, but also (as in 
extreme addictive behavior) sometimes subverting SA.  Intentions can be dynamically 
shaped in relation to how others are behaving, and by what is deemed acceptable 
behavior within specific sub-cultures.  
In the case of Hysteria or Conversion Disorder, there is also a loss of the sense of 
agency over bodily action.  But, as Spence (2009, 276) states: “All hysterical phenomena 
arise within social milieus ….”  The presence or absence of specific others (sometimes 
the medical personnel) has an effect on the symptom, so that there is symptomatic 
inconsistency from one social setting to another.  Spence points to the particular social 
milieu of Charcot’s practice in Paris, Freud’s practice in Vienna, and the First World War 
battlefront – social arrangements that seemed to encourage the development of hysterical 
symptoms.  As he indicates, “There is clearly a need for further work in this area” 
(Spence 2009). 
Let me conclude with one further example.  In 2009 my daughter Laura 
volunteered with the Peace Corps in South Africa, focusing her efforts on HIV education.  
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She recounts that her attempts to motivate residents in a small village outside of Pretoria 
to help themselves by engaging in particular activities were met by a certain sardonic 
attitude and even polite laughter. They explained that they were unable to help 
themselves simply because, as everyone knew, they were lazy.  That’s “the way they 
were,” they explained, and they knew this because all their life they had been told so by 
various educational and governmental institutions, especially under the apartheid regime.  
In effect, because of the contingencies of certain long-standing social arrangements, with 
prolonged effects, they had no long-term sense of agency, and this robbed them of 
possibilities for action.   
It certainly seems possible that an individual could convince himself of his 
laziness, without the effects of external forces playing such a causal role.  But it is 
difficult to conceive of what would motivate such a normative judgment, or even that 
there could be such a normative judgment outside of a social environment.  Could there 
be a form of self-observation that would lead to a self-ascription of laziness that would 
not involve a comparison with what others do or do not do, or with certain expectations 
set by others?  It seems quite possible that some people, or social arrangements, more 
than others may make me feel less in charge of my life, or more empowered; and it seems 
quite possible that I can allow (or cannot prevent) others, or some social arrangements, to 
make me feel more or less empowered.  There are certain ways of raising children, and 
certain ways of treating others that lead them to feeling empowered, with a more 
expansive sense of agency than one finds in other cases where it goes the other way.  
None of these possible adumbrations in an individual’s sense of agency – from the Peace 
Corp volunteer who, at least at the beginning, feels empowered enough to risk the effort, 
to the victim of apartheid, who in the end has very little sense of agency – happen in 
social isolation. 
If, in thinking about action and agency, we need to look at the most relevant 
pragmatic level, that level is not the level of mental or brain states.  We shouldn’t be 
looking exclusively inside the head.  Rather, embodied action happens in a world that is 
physical and social and that often reflects perceptual and affective valiances, and the 
effects of forces and affordances that are both physical and social.  Notions of agency and 
intention, as well as autonomy and responsibility, are best conceived in terms that include 
social effects.  Intentions often get co-constituted in interactions with others – indeed, 
some kinds of intentions may not be reducible to processes that are contained exclusively 
within one individual.  In such cases, the sense of agency is a matter of degree – it can be 
enhanced or reduced by physical, social, economic, and cultural factors – sometimes 
working through our own narrative practices, but also by loss of motor control or 
disruptions in pre-reflective action-consciousness. 
 
	  
	  
References	  
	  
Aartsa,	  H.	  Custersa,	  R.	  Wegner,	  D.	  M.	  2005.	  On	  the	  inference	  of	  personal	  authorship:	  
Enhancing	   experienced	   agency	   by	   priming	   effect	   information.	   Consciousness	  
and	  Cognition	  14:	  439–458	  
Allen,	  M.	  2009.	  The	  body	  in	  action:	  Intention,	  action-­‐consciousness,	  and	  compulsion.	  
	   Page	  16	  
MA	  thesis.	  University	  of	  Hertfordshire.	  
Block,	   N.	   1995.	   On	   a	   confusion	   about	   a	   function	   of	   consciousness.	  Behavioral	   and	  
Brain	  Sciences	  18:	  227-­‐247.	  
Bratman,	   M.	   E.	   1987.	   Intention,	   Plans,	   and	   Practical	   Reason.	   Cambridge,	   MA:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  
Chaminade,	  T.	  and	  Decety,	   J.	  2002.	  Leader	  or	  follower?	  Involvement	  of	  the	  inferior	  
parietal	  lobule	  in	  agency.	  Neuroreport	  13	  (1528):	  1975-­‐78.	  
Desmurget,	  M.,	  Reilly,	  K.	  T.,	  Richard,	  N.,	  Szathmari,	  A.,	  Mottolese,	  C.	  Sirigu,	  A.	  	  2009.	  
Movement	   intention	  after	  parietal	  cortex	  stimulation	   in	  humans.	  Science	  324:	  
811-­‐13.	  
Farrer,	   C.,	   Franck,	   N.	   Georgieff,	   N.	   Frith,	   C.D.	   	   Decety,	   J.	   and	   Jeannerod,	   M.	   2003.	  	  
Modulating	   the	  experience	  of	  agency:	  a	  positron	  emission	   tomography	  study.	  
NeuroImage	  18:	  324–333	  
Farrer,	  C.	  and	  	  Frith,	  C.D.	  2002.	  Experiencing	  oneself	  vs.	  another	  person	  as	  being	  the	  
cause	   of	   an	   action:	   the	   neural	   correlates	   of	   the	   experience	   of	   agency.	  
NeuroImage	  15:	  596-­‐603.	  
Frankfurt,	  H.	  G.	  1988.	  The	  Importance	  of	  What	  We	  Care	  About:	  Philosophical	  Essays.	  
Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Gallagher,	  S.	  2000a.	  	  Philosophical	  conceptions	  of	  the	  self:	  implications	  for	  cognitive	  
science.	  Trends	  in	  Cognitive	  Science	  	  4	  (1):	  14-­‐21.	  
Gallagher,	   S.	   2000b.	   Self-­‐reference	   and	   schizophrenia:	   A	   cognitive	   model	   of	  
immunity	   to	  error	   through	  misidentification.	   In	  D.	  Zahavi	   (ed.),	  Exploring	   the	  
Self:	  Philosophical	  and	  Psychopathological	  Perspectives	  on	  Self-­‐experience	   	   (pp.	  
203-­‐39).	  	  Amsterdam	  &	  Philadelphia:	  John	  Benjamins.	  
Gallagher,	  S.	  2005.	  How	  the	  Body	  Shapes	  the	  Mind.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
Gallagher, S. 2006. Where's the action? Epiphenomenalism and the problem of free will.  
In W. Banks, S. Pockett, and S. Gallagher. Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?  
An Investigation of the Nature of Volition (109-124).  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.	  
Gallagher, S. 2007. The natural philosophy of agency.  Philosophy Compass 2:	  347-357.	  
Gallagher, S. 2010. Complexities in the sense of agency. New Ideas in Psychology 30: 
15–31 
Gallagher, S. and Zahavi, D. 2008. The Phenomenological Mind. London: Routledge.	  
Graham,	   G.	   and	   Stephens,	   G.	   L.	   1994.	   Mind	   and	   mine.	   	   In	   G.	   Graham	   and	   G.	   L.	  
Stephens	   (eds.),	  Philosophical	   Psychopathology	   (pp.	   91-­‐109).	   Cambridge,	  MA:	  
MIT	  Press.	  
Grünbaum,	   T.	   2009.	   Action	   and	   agency.	   	   In	   S.	   Gallagher	   and	  D.	   Schmicking	   (eds.),	  
Handbook	  of	  Phenomenology	  and	  Cognitive	  Science.	  Dordrect:	  Springer.	  
Haggard,	  P.	  2003.	  Conscious	  awareness	  of	  intention	  and	  of	  action.	  In	  J.	  Roessler	  &	  N.	  
Eilan	   (Eds.)	   Agency	   and	   Self-­‐awareness.	   Oxford:	   Oxford	   University	   Press,	   pp.	  
111-­‐127.	  
Jeannerod,	   M.	   and	   Pacherie,	   E.	   2004.	   	   Agency,	   simulation,	   and	   self-­‐identification.	  
Mind	  and	  Language	  19	  (2):	  113-­‐46.	  
Lafargue,	  G.,	  Paillard,	  J.	  Lamarre,	  Y.,	  and	  Sirigu,	  Y.	  2003.	  Production	  and	  perception	  
of	  grip	  force	  without	  proprioception:	  is	  there	  a	  sense	  of	  effort	  in	  deafferented	  
subjects?	  European	  Journal	  of	  Neuroscience	  17	  (12):	  2741-­‐9.	  
	   Page	  17	  
Libet,	   B.	   1985.	   Unconscious	   cerebral	   initiative	   and	   the	   role	   of	   conscious	   will	   in	  
voluntary	  action.	  Behavioral	  and	  Brain	  Sciences,	  8:	  529-­‐66.	  
Marcel,	   A.	   2003.	   The	   sense	   of	   agency:	   Awareness	   and	   ownership	   of	   action.	   In	   J.	  
Roessler	   &	   N.	   Eilan	   (Eds.),	   Agency	   and	   Awarness	   (48-­‐93).	   Oxford:	   Oxford	  
University	  Press.	  
Nagel,	  T.	  1970.	  The	  Possibility	  of	  Altruism.	  Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press.	  
Pacherie,	   E.	   2007.	   The	   sense	   of	   control	   and	   the	   sense	   of	   agency.	   Psyche	   13	   (1).	  
(http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/).	  
Pacherie,	  E.	  2006.	  Towards	  a	  dynamic	  theory	  of	  intentions.	  In	  S.	  Pockett,	  W.P.	  Banks	  
&	  S.	  Gallagher	  (eds.),	  Does	  Consciousness	  Cause	  Behavior?	  An	  Investigation	  of	  the	  
Nature	  of	  Volition	  (145-­‐167).	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  Press.	  	  
Robinson,	  T.	  and	  Berridge,	  K.	  2000.	  The	  psychology	  and	  neurobiology	  of	  addiction:	  
an	  incentive-­‐sensitization	  view.	  Addiction	  95	  (8s2):	  91-­‐117.	  
Robinson,	  T.	  and	  Berridge,	  K.	  1993.	  The	  neural	  basis	  of	  drug	  craving:	  an	  incentive-­‐
sensitization	  theory	  of	  addiction.	  	  Brain	  Res	  Rev	  18	  (3):	  247-­‐291.	  
Sartre,	   J.-­‐P.	  1969.	   	  Being	  and	  Nothingness:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Phenomenological	  Ontology,	  
trans.	  H.E.	  Barnes.	  London:	  Routledge.	  
Searle,	   J.	   1983.	   Intentionality:	   An	   Essay	   in	   the	   Philosophy	   of	   Mind.	   	   Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Sebanz	   N.,	   Bekkering	   H.	   and	   Knoblich	   G.	   2006.	   Joint	   action:	   bodies	   and	   minds	  
moving	  together.	  Trends	  in	  Cognitive	  Sciences	  10:	  70–76	  
Sebanz, N., Knoblich, G. and Prinz, W. 2003. Representing others’ actions: Just like 
one’s own? Cognition 88: B11–B21 
Spence,	  S.	  2009.	  The	  Actor’s	  Brain.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
Stephens	  G.	  L.	  and	  Graham	  G.	  2000.	  When	  Self-­‐Consciousness	  Breaks:	  Alien	  Voices	  and	  
Inserted	  Thoughts.	  	  Cambridge	  MA:	  MIT	  Press.	  
Synofzik,	   M.	   Vosgerau,	   G.,	   and	   Newen,	   A.	   2008.	   Beyond	   the	   comparator	  model:	   A	  
multifactorial	  two-­‐step	  account	  of	  agency.	  Consciousness	  and	  Cognition	  17	  (1):	  
219-­‐239.	  
Takahama,	   S.,	   Kumada,	   T.,	  &	   Saiki,	   J.	   2005.	   Perception	   of	   other's	   action	   influences	  
performance	  in	  Simon	  task	  [Abstract].	  Journal	  of	  Vision	  5	  (8):	  396,	  396a,	  
Tsakiris,	  M.	  2005.	  On	  agency	  and	  body-­‐ownership.	  Paper	  presented	  at	  Expérience	  
Subjective	  Pré-­‐Réflexive	  &	  Action	  (ESPRA)	  Conference,	  CREA,	  Paris.	  December	  
2005.	  	  
Tsakiris,	   M.	   Bosbach	   S.	   and	   Gallagher,	   S.	   2007.	   On	   agency	   and	   body-­‐ownership:	  
Phenomenological	  and	  neuroscientific	  reflections.	  	  Consciousness	  and	  Cognition	  
16	  (3):	  645-­‐60.	  
Tsakiris,	   M.	   and	   Haggard,	   P.	   2005.	   Experimenting	   with	   the	   acting	   self.	   Cognitive	  
Neuropsychology	  22	  (3/4):	  387–407.	  	  
 
